

13 JAN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral David L. McDonald
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy

THROUGH: Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor
Director of Naval Intelligence

SUBJECT: Downgrading of CIA Report, [REDACTED]

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1. In response to your request of 7 January I am pleased to inform you that we have been able to downgrade the subject report. The attached version now classified at the SECRET level has only minor changes of detail from the original text. The adjustment made to the text did not warrant any change in our principal findings and conclusions.

2. If you desire or need additional detail, please let us know. New information on this intelligence problem will, of course, be provided in our regular intelligence publications or in special reports when required.

[REDACTED]
RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Enclosure:

"Cargoes Moved Through Ports of North Vietnam and Simonville, Cambodia, in 1965, and Cambodia as a Source of Supplies for the Viet Cong" (S-1774, 12 January 1966)

cc: Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (w/encl)

Distribution:


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OD/ORR [REDACTED]

(13 Jan 66)



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CARGOES MOVED THROUGH PORTS OF NORTH VIETNAM AND SIHANOUKVILLE, CAMBODIA,
IN 1965, AND CAMBODIA AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLIES FOR THE VIET CONG

ORR Report S-1774

12 January 1966

Office of Research and Reports

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CARGOES MOVED THROUGH PORTS OF NORTH VIETNAM AND SIHANOUKVILLE, CAMBODIA, IN 1965, AND CAMBODIA AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLIES FOR THE VIET CONG

Cargoes Moved Through Ports of North Vietnam and Sihanoukville

During 1965 there were 530 foreign merchant ship arrivals at ports of North Vietnam about half of which were Free World ships. A breakdown of these arrivals by country of registry is contained in Table 1. Identified cargoes delivered by these ships totaled 690,000 tons mostly POL, fertilizer, bulk foodstuffs and miscellaneous cargoes. Free World ships carried about 36 percent of these imports. A breakdown of identified seaborne imports is given in Table 2. None of these imports have been identified as arms or ammunition. However, there is little information on the cargoes carried by the 143 Chinese Communist ships that called at North Vietnam in 1965.

During 1965 there were 280 merchant ship arrivals at Sihanoukville, Cambodia, of which 255 were Free World ships. A breakdown of these arrivals by country of registry is given in Table 3. Cargoes delivered by these ships totaled 229,000 tons, three-fourths of which were delivered by Free World ships. Only two-thirds of these cargoes can be identified by commodity, as shown in Table 4.

Small amounts of medicine are known to be included in the cargo of at least 3 ships that arrived in Cambodia in 1965. A small shipment arrived on a British ship in April; 58 crates of medicines arrived from Communist China on a Greek ship in July; and 4 batches of medicine valued at \$4,000 arrived from China in August. It is possible that some of this medicine was included in the 45 cases of medical supplies that Sihanouk openly presented to the Viet Cong in September. More significant than the foregoing, however, is recent evidence that the USSR has shipped a large quantity of penicillin which may arrive at Sihanoukville before the end of the year. It is possible that this penicillin is destined for support of the Viet Cong.

Cambodia as a Source of Supplies for the Viet Cong

Except for these shipments of medicines, we can not support a judgment that the ships calling at Sihanoukville during 1965 carried any significant quantity of goods for direct or indirect shipment to the Viet Cong. We estimate, however, that the Viet Cong obtain a small quantity of supplies from Cambodia. Most of the supplies are either indigenous to Cambodia or arrived through normal trade channels, but some have probably also moved in clandestine channels. These supplies are moved across the border into South Vietnam by smugglers, or Viet Cong purchasing agents. Primitive transport is used primarily.

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Many of the reports concerning the possible shipment of arms to the Viet Cong through Cambodia have apparently been engendered by the deliveries, beginning in late 1964 and continuing into 1965, of weapons from Communist China to Cambodia. There has been no effort by Cambodia or Communist China, however, to conceal these military deliveries which have been in fulfillment of the Chinese Communist military aid agreement with Cambodia. This agreement calls for sufficient equipment, arms, and ammunition for 27,000 men.

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Sihanouk has also announced the shipments and provided a breakdown of the weapons supplied. Although it has been impossible to trace the precise disposition of rifles or machine guns delivered to Cambodia, this equipment is being used to rearm Cambodian military and paramilitary units and the units are required to account accurately for the weapons and ammunition allocated to them. It seems unlikely that any significant amount of this equipment or ammunition has been supplied to the Viet Cong, although some of the replaced equipment may have been obtained by them through clandestine means.

The Sihanouk government has been particularly sensitive to allegations that the Viet Cong are receiving weapons via Cambodia. Recent press reports concerning the possible use of Sihanoukville by the Communists has prompted Sihanouk to ask the International Control Commission (ICC) to "control" the port. Members of the ICC have recently been in Sihanoukville inspecting manifests and making an assessment of the personnel requirements for maintaining a permanent inspection team. No matter how thorough an inspection the ICC is able to make, however, there is no way of guaranteeing that the Communists will not make use of Cambodia to get military supplies to the Viet Cong. Other evidence, including the fact that the Communists have devoted a considerable effort to improving and expanding their infiltration network through Laos, suggests, however, that they intend to rely on other routes, at least for the immediate future.

Most of the supplies that the Viet Cong have procured in or through Cambodia have consisted of materials that can be purchased on the open market, including food, drugs and medical supplies, and electrical equipment such as radios, batteries and tubes. Although some of these supplies are purchased in Cambodia and infiltrated into South Vietnam, the major source of these supplies for the Viet Cong is South Vietnam itself. The extent to which Cambodia is being used as a transfer area or as a source of arms and ammunition is difficult to assess. Various reports have indicated that arms and ammunition have moved from Cambodia to South Vietnam. Evidence, including the testimony of numerous Viet Cong prisoners who were engaged in supply operations from Cambodia, indicates that such movements probably are small in terms of the total amount of such materials infiltrated into South

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Vietnam. The Communists almost certainly have the capability to increase substantially the volume of military supplies currently crossing the Cambodia - South Vietnam border, but it is doubtful that, through clandestine means alone, they could move, on a sustained basis, even the 12 tons of military supplies now needed daily by the VC/PAVN forces in South Vietnam from sources outside the country. This doubt arises principally from the fact that illicit traffic of this volume could hardly clear the port of Sihanoukville without detection. If the 12 tons could be landed at Sihanoukville or other points along the coast, the Communists could undoubtedly move this tonnage forward into South Vietnam. At a minimum, however, the ability of the Communists to move goods clandestinely through Cambodia is sufficient to provide an important adjunct to infiltration of supplies by other means.

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Table 1

Foreign Flag Ship Arrivals in North Vietnam
during 1965

<u>Flag</u>	<u>Number of Arrivals</u>
Total	<u>530</u>
Free World	<u>257</u>
UK	137
Japan	37
Norway	29
Greece	28
Lebanon	9
Netherlands	5
Liberia	4
France	2
Malta	2
Cyprus	2
Panama	1
Italy	1
USSR	<u>72</u>
Eastern European Communist countries	<u>49</u>
Poland	40
Czechoslovakia	4
Bulgaria	4
Albania	1
Communist China	<u>143</u>
Cuba	<u>2</u>

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Table 2

Cargoes Delivered to North Vietnam by Foreign Merchant Ships in 1965 a/

000 metric tons

<u>Carrier</u>	<u>Number of calls</u>	<u>Bulk Foodstuffs</u>	<u>Fertilizer</u>	<u>POL</u>	<u>Timber</u>	<u>Misc.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total by all foreign ships	<u>530</u>	<u>121.5</u>	<u>162.4</u>	<u>167.0</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>227.1</u>	<u>690.5</u>
Free World Ships	<u>257</u>	<u>102.8</u>	<u>58.7</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>67.5</u>	<u>246.6</u>
Communist Ships	<u>273</u>	<u>18.7</u>	<u>103.7</u>	<u>153.6</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>159.6</u>	<u>443.9</u>
Soviet	79	13.9	89.4	151.6	8.0	116.5	379.4
Chinese b/	143	1.1	--	--	--	15.7	16.8
East European	49	3.7	14.3	2.0	0.2	27.3	47.5
Cuba	2	--	--	--	--	--	--

a/ These figures are a preliminary estimate. Components may not add to totals due to rounding.

b/ Data on Chinese Communist shipping to North Vietnam is notably deficient, particularly for information on cargoes carried.

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Table 4

Cargoes Delivered at Sihanoukville, Cambodia
by Merchant Ships of All Flags in 1965

(Thousand Metric Tons)

Total Cargoes	<u>229</u>
General cargo	40
Cement	36
Coal	29
Metals	22
Rubber (for transshipment)	10
Chemicals	8
Foodstuffs	8
Unidentified	76

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